

Characterizing Verification Tools through Coding Error Candidates Reported in Space Flight Software

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Introduction



- Verification tools are in widespread use
- Their actual capabilities have not been systematically assessed yet
- To improve the situation, DLR has initiated an evaluation of 5 widely-used tools

Error, Fault, Failure, Defect



- Error: Bad or undesired state
- Fault: Cause of an error ("coding mistake")
- Failure: Externally visible non-compliance as result of an error
- Defect: Any trouble with a software product, its external behaviour or its internal features, including maintainability.
- Error may be abstract ("virtual machine") or concrete ("on target hardware")
- Every fault is a defect, but not vice versa.

Fault



Error



Failure


False/True, Positive/Negative




	Defect present	Defect NOT present
Report present	True Positive	False Positive
Report NOT present	False Negative	True Negative

- False Negative: (Possibly critical) defect remains undetected
- False Positive: Added effort without added value
- High number of false positives may mean that not all reports can be analysed
 - ⇒ True positives may effectively become false negatives

Sensitivity, Precision



Sensitivity= TP/Defects



Precision= TP/Reports

- Higher sensitivity ⇒ Less false negatives
- Higher precision ⇒ Less false positives
- Ideally, both should be as high as possible.

Verification Issues



- Verification tools shall aid in the detection of noncompliances
- But: Actual capabilities of tools (in contrast to advertised capabilities) are not known
- ⇒ Use of a tool provides nothing more than a good feeling

The Position of Standards



- ECSS (space domain)
 - Verification: Confirmation that product is built right
 - Recognises varying degrees of verification effort
 - Software Verification Plan subject to negotiations
 - Recommends use of static analysis tools in general
- DO178C/ED-12C (aviation)
 - Verification: detect and report faults ("unintended functionality")
 - Detailed process definitions in the standard
 - Verification tools subject to qualification

Standards vs. Tools




- Neither DO178 nor ECSS address tool characteristics
- DO178 requires tool qualification
 - Show that tool performs correctly in scenario agreed upon
- ECSS does not address tool characteristics
 - Tool selection must be agreed upon by customer and supplier
- Tool diversification is not a topic in either standard

Fault Coverage vs. Code Coverage




- Standards focus on code/requirements coverage
 - Define concrete coverage figures
 - ECSS: coverage fixed only for highest safety category
- Fault coverage is not addressed
 - Cannot be derived, as number of faults not known
 - But defect type coverage can be addressed

Fault Detection



Static Analysis

Test




Complementary Analysis Methods




- Dynamic Analysis
 - Limitations: Only sample scenarios
 - Representative Environment possible ("test on target")
- Static Analysis
 - Limitations: Only specific defect types
 - Conservative guarantee possible, at the cost of limited precision
- Model-based Analysis may suffer from lack of model accuracy
 - E.g. Symbolic execution, abstract analysis

Mastering Risks of False Negatives



- Risk: Tool is expected to cover defect type, but does not
- Mitigation
 - Knowledge about actual tool capabilities
 - Use of multiple, complementary tools




Objectives of the activity



- Estimate sensitivity and precision of verification tools by defect type, based on the analysis of a piece of space software.
- Establish a reproducible process for such an estimation.

General Process Considerations



- Tools should be evaluated independently of each other
- Worst- and Best-Case
 - Initial Configuration without information
 - Optimized Configuration with feedback from tool vendors
- TP/FP status must be established
 - Manual analysis
 - Number of reports may be too high to analyse all
 - Random subset of reports is analysed
- Original and conditioned S/W version
 - Induce defects known from other space S/W

Fault Activation

```
BSSE System and Software Engineering
```

```
float sin(float x) { return 0.0f; }
void someSystemFunction(short n) {
  float y = sin((float)n*M_PI);
  /* ... */
}
```

```
■ sin() is faulty
```

- But: no failure at system level!
- Fault is temporarily disabled



Maintenance

```
float sin(float x) { return 0.0f; }

void someSystemFunction(short n) {
  float y, z;
  y = sin((float)n*M_PI);
  z = sin((float)(n+1)*M_PI/2);
  /* ... */
}
```

- sin() is <u>still</u> faulty
- Temporarily disabled fault has been activated!

Is a report about the faulty sin() a false positive or not?


Conflicting Issues



- As a unit, the sin()-example is faulty ⇒ true positive
- At system level:
 - First version is correct ⇒ false positive
 - Second version is faulty ⇒ true positive
- More generic: "Design by contract"
 - Caller ensures pre-conditions
- But: additional effort to
 - document contract
 - prove adherence to contract at every call...
 - ...and every change!
- Increased risk for reuse

False Negative Detection






- True positives for one tool may be false negatives for other tool
- Additional findings possible during report review


Process Overview






Repeated for conditioned S/W version

The Evaluation Process





The Tool Candidates




- The candidate tools cover the methods
 - Abstract interpretation
 - Symbolic execution
 - Automated Test/Stimulation with heuristic oracles
- Tools are widely known and/or have been used in space projects already
- No manual intervention required, except...
 - configuration
 - analysis of results

The Selected Code



- Developed for space use
- Size data:
 - 85 c-Files
 - 119 h-Files
 - 825 Functions
 - 45kLOC (w/o comments, empty lines)

Conclusions



- Study shall estimate sensitivity, precision of tools by defect type
- Major step forward regarding defect coverage expected
 - Tools can be selected matching verification strategy
 - Feedback to tool vendors
- May increase effectiveness and efficiency in S/W V&V
- Community is invited to contribute...
 - Known defect types
 - Tool suggestions for future investigations



Thank you for your attention!