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R.Gerlich, R.Gerlich (BSSE) Integrated Design and Testing of Safety-Critical **Real-time Systems in Space**

MBTUC11 Model-Based Testing


MBT User Conference 2011 19.10.2011 Berlin, Germany

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MBT in context of MDE





Test in context of V&V:

- Tests support verification
- Tests support validation

Verification

provide input-output vectors


support fault injection

of a system

Model =

Abstract representation


Model




Testing on modelling and on target level: Are these two different things?


Validation


- provide feedback on specification
- provide performance figures













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What is a Model?

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A model represents a specification



UML?

Ada code when re-engineering?


Contents of a spreadsheet?

DSL code?

Taking a specification as base for tests
All model types we have used for
code generation (fully automated)
test generation (fully automated)


Sichere What is a Test Input on Modelling Level Software





A test plan and test procedures derived from a model?

Test stimuli automatically derived from a model and automatically documented together with results?




Stimulus for an FSM

valid or invalid

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Stimulus for commands, msgs and data valid or invalid, lost



A set of non-functional parameters deadline, timeout, period A variation of ideal parameters time jitter, execution time


A test input may also be omitting of an expected input e.g. in case of fault injection: loss of data or events


important for critical, fault-tolerant systems

Automatically derived test stimuli may also support early operation of a system

Material Science Laboratory ISS


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
3 faults detected in first version of code and test generators from 2000 - 2003:


- limitation to 250 ground commands
- task priority list for distributed system not correct
- overflow in union (16 bit cmd counter)
- no more faults flagged from the project since 2003/2009




System Initialisation Procedure <Probability to reach the end> = ? How critical is my system?


Inversion of positive functionality







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- Sub-sets (nets) of states, no transition possible
- Fault? in this case: hidden information ⇒ testability?
- Conclusion: difficult (*impossible*) verification of application regarding behaviour

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Performance Characteristics

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Software	
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Ada


- ~1 Mio. lines of source code, ~430 KLOC
- FSM
 - 38 FSMs / processes
 - 616 different commands
 - 637 commands in total,
 - 360 different states
 - 381 states in total
 - 1475 transitions
 - 4695 different tuples
 - 9778 atomic actions in FSMs
- Time statistics
 - ISGL model generation from Ada: < 5s
 - system code generation: ~10min
 - stimulation: 2000% coverage of input domain (20x at least) ~70 min. (~ 3cmds/s)

(inputs of FSMs, stimuli) tuples of (FSM,cmd)

tuples of (FSM,state)
(names)
(FSM, msg, initial state, final state)

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
Evaluation of non-functional properties: Sichere Distributed Synchronous System




Integration on C code level Synthesis of two models ISGL for behaviour and real-time Stimulation from behavioural model Scade/Lustre for control algorithms Stimulation data provided from Scade analysis **Sensor inputs Cvclic** HW I/F **Data Acqusition** Preprocessing PP1 PP2 PP3 Pre-processing Monitoring Moni1 Moni2 Moni3 Voting 3-fold redundant processing network **Operator Interface** Redundancy Filtering Voter2 Ops 2 Voter1 Voter3 Voter4 Ops 1 FB Voting 2/2 2/2 **Controller Outputs** Actuators Man/machine Contronic E interface Voter output: yes / no

Impact of Time Jitter and Data Loss

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high fault rate at rather low time jitter and/or low rate of loss of data



↑ % faults / voter discrepancies

 \rightarrow % Time jitter

Theoretical prediction and "confirmation" after raising doubts, but before ISG V&V: <u>"should be robust in case of time jitter"</u>

